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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine there is a river, and a half mile to the river’s east is a 
twenty-acre wetland. To the east of the wetland is a neighborhood. The 
river’s eastern bank is seven feet above the mean water line, and the 
western bank is ten feet above the mean water line. If the river floods to 
eight feet above the mean water line, it will spill over the eastern bank. 
The water will flow unfettered for half a mile. However, upon reaching 
the wetland, much of the flooding water could be absorbed. One acre of 
                                                                                                                     
 * Editor’s Note: This Note won the Gertrude Brick Prize for the best Note of the 2009–
10 academic year. 
 ** J.D. expected May 2011, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I would like to 
thank Laura and Anna Marie for their love and support. I would also like to thank Professor 
Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, whose advice and feedback helped make this Note possible. 
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wetland flooded to one foot can hold up to 330,000 gallons of water.1 
Therefore, the twenty acres in our hypothetical could absorb up to 
6,600,000 gallons of water. This could stop the flooding water, or at 
least hinder its progress. However, if the wetland were filled in and 
replaced with a shopping center, this flood control function would be 
unavailable. The impervious cover of the shopping buildings and 
accompanying parking lots would prevent the surface absorption of any 
water, possibly exacerbating flood damage farther down the water’s 
path.2 Therefore, the wetland’s mitigating effect on flood damage would 
be trumped by the shopping center’s exacerbating effect. If the wetland 
were not under Clean Water Act3 (CWA) jurisdiction, the shopping 
center developer could proceed without Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) oversight, 
possibly imposing flood damage externalities on the adjacent 
neighborhood.   
If a CWA § 404 permit were required,4 the Corps could assure that 
the developer avoids, minimizes, and mitigates any harm posed to the 
wetland and, consequently, to the town.5 However, requiring the would-
be-developer to acquire CWA permits would impose a significant 
financial burden.6 Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence shows a 
reluctance to impose such permits unless the CWA’s statutory language 
makes abundantly clear that doing so comports with its framers’ intent.7 
Discontented with these judicial decisions, House and Senate 
Democrats have drafted legislation reasserting federal control over 
waters cut out by the Court, and arguably beyond.8 The Clean Water 
                                                                                                                     
 1. JON KUSLER &  TERESA OPHEIM, OUR NATIONAL WETLAND HERITAGE: A PROTECTION 
GUIDE 5 (2d ed. 1996). 
 2. For information on impervious cover, the “land cover that water cannot penetrate,” see 
Craig Anthony Arnold, Clean-Water Land Use: Connecting Scale and Function, 23 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 291, 294–301 (2006). 
 3. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). 
 4. Id. § 1344 (requiring Corps’ authorization to add dredged or fill material into 
jurisdictional waters). 
 5. The Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, 110th Cong. 471 (2008) [hereinafter CWRA of 2007 House 
Hearings] (statement of The Hon. John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army). 
 6. See David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental Regulation 
by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process, 42 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 59, 74–75 (2002). 
 7. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (plurality opinion) (“We 
ordinarily expect a ‘clear and manifest’ statement from Congress to authorize an unprecedented 
intrusion into traditional state authority.”); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC] (“Where an 
administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect 
a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”). 
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Restoration Act of 2009 (CWRA), which cleared the Senate 
Environmental and Public Works Committee in June of 2009,9 is the 
latest of these proposals.10 Under the current form of the CWRA, it is 
uncertain how many additional landowners, if any, would be pulled into 
Corps and EPA permitting authority.11 This uncertainty is cause for 
concern. 
Congress passed the Clean Water Act to “restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”12 
The Act exerted federal control over the nation’s “navigable waters,”13 
defined ambiguously as “the waters of the United States, including the 
territorial seas.”14 Congress granted the EPA ultimate discretion to 
interpret which waters were jurisdictional.15 Between 1985 and 2006, a 
triad of Supreme Court decisions weighed in on the interpretations, with 
                                                                                                                     
[T]his Act will treat, as “waters of the United States”, those features that were 
treated as such pursuant to the regulations of the Environmental Protection 
Agency and the Corps of Engineers in existence before the dates of [the 
Rapanos and SWANCC decisions], including—(A) all waters which are subject 
to the ebb and flow of the tide; (B) all interstate waters, including interstate 
wetlands; (C) all other waters, such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams 
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie 
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds; (D) all impoundments of 
waters of the United States; (E) tributaries of the aforementioned waters; (F) 
the territorial seas; and (G) wetlands adjacent to the aforementioned waters[.] 
Id. § 3(8). 
 9. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Env’t. & Pub. Works, EPW Comm. Approves 
Clean Water Restoration Act (June 19, 2009), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.c 
fm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=F95AB046-802A-23AD-46DC-
40C4F53FB380.  
 10. Earlier proposals, all similar in intended effect, are the Clean Water Restoration Act of 
2007, S. 1870, 110th Cong. (2007), the Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 2421, 110th 
Cong. (2007), the Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2005, S. 912, 109th Cong. (2005), 
the Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2003, S. 473, 108th Cong. (2003), and the Clean 
Water Authority Restoration Act of 2002, S. 2780, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 11. See Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: S. 787, Clean Water Restoration 
Act, at 2 (2009) [hereinafter CWRA CBO Cost Estimate]. 
 12. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
 13. Id. § 1344(a). 
 14. Id. § 1362(7). 
 15. Donna M. Downing et al., Navigating Through Clean Water Act Jurisdiction: A Legal 
Review, 23 WETLANDS 475, 483 (2003). 
In 1979, the Secretary of the Army requested the Attorney General of the 
United States to clarify whether the Corps or EPA had the ultimate 
administrative authority to determine the reach of the term “navigable waters” 
for purposes of CWA section 404. In his opinion letter, Attorney General 
[Benjamin] Civiletti determined that “‘navigable waters’ can have only one 
interpretation under the Act,” and EPA is charged with administering the entire 
Clean Water Act. 
Id.  
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the latter two decisions significantly narrowing which waters should be 
included.16 Depending on whether a reader looks to the plurality opinion 
or to the concurrence, the Supreme Court’s latest word on the issue, 
Rapanos v. United States,17 limits federal jurisdiction to either 1) 
“relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of 
water”18 and “wetlands with a continuous surface connection” to those 
waters19 or 2) those waters possessing a “significant nexus” to navigable 
waters.20 
The main thrust of the CWRA is to remove the word “navigable” 
from the definition of waters reached by the CWA.21 Neither the 2009 
version of the CWRA nor its House and Senate predecessors have been 
warmly received by the regulated community.22 Whereas environmental 
groups have extolled the Act’s benefits and largely ignored the potential 
costs,23 private property advocates have focused solely on the burdens 
the Act will impose while ignoring the potential benefits.24 Opponents 
argue that the Act extends beyond Congress’ commerce powers.25 They 
argue that the Act pushes jurisdiction beyond areas of national concern 
                                                                                                                     
 16. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006) (plurality opinion); SWANCC, 
531 U.S. 159, 170–74 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 
131–39 (1985). 
 17. 547 U.S. 715. 
 18. Id. at 739 (plurality opinion). 
 19. Id. at 742. 
 20. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 21. CWRA, supra note 8, § 5(1). 
 22. See generally, e.g., The Future of Specialty Crops for Small Family Farmers: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Rural Development, Entrepreneurship and Trade of the H. Comm. on 
Small Business, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Bill Holbrook, Owner, Cold Mountain 
Farms); Meeting the Needs of Small Businesses and Family Farmers in Regulating Our Nation’s 
Waters: Hearing Before the  H. Comm. on Small Business, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of 
James K. Chilton, Jr., on behalf of Arizona Cattle Growers Association, Public Lands Council, 
and National Cattlemen’s Beef Association); Meeting the Needs of Small Businesses and Family 
Farmers in Regulating Our Nation’s Waters: Hearing Before the H.Comm. on Small Business, 
111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Bob Gray, Executive Director, Northeast Dairy Farm 
Cooperatives); Meeting the Needs of Small Businesses and Family Farmers in Regulating our 
Nation’s Waters: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Business, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(statement of Trey Pebley, Vice President, McAllen Construction, Inc.); Meeting the Needs of 
Small Businesses and Family Farmers in Regulating Our Nation’s Waters: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on Small Business, 111th Cong. (2009) (written testimony of Lyle Schellenberg, 
President, Armadillo Underground, Inc. and National Utility Contractors Association); CWRA of 
2007 House Hearings, supra note 5 (statement of The Hon. John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant 
Secretary of the Army). 
 23. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Restoring the Clean Water Act, 
http://illinois.sierraclub.org/legislation/2009/docs/federal/CWRAFactSheet7.09.pdf (last visited 
May 15, 2010). 
 24. See supra note 22. 
 25. See Is the Clean Water Restoration Act Constitutional?, 
http://rapanos.typepad.com/my_weblog/2009/06/plf-calls-clean-water-restoration-act-clearly-un 
con stitutional.html (June 1, 2009). 
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and “eliminate[s] the current separation between the state and federal 
government, bringing the federal government into local land use 
decisions.”26 This arguably leaves property owners subject to a more 
distant and less responsive authority than that found in state 
governments. Additionally, opponents argue the financial burdens 
imposed by extending federal jurisdiction will unduly restrict property 
owners’ rights to utilize their land.27 
This Note addresses the concerns with the Clean Water Restoration 
Act. Following the Introduction, Part II briefly outlines what constitutes 
a wetland and why protection is important. Part III summarizes the 
history of the CWA’s § 404 permitting scheme and reviews the three 
pivotal Supreme Court decisions. Following the review is a description 
of the resulting CWRA legislation. Part IV addresses the 
constitutionality of the CWRA, in particular whether it exceeds 
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause28 and whether it 
improperly impinges on state sovereignty. A look at modern Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence demonstrates that Congress is indeed empowered 
to pass the CWRA.29 Many CWRA waters are “things in interstate 
commerce,” and all included waters “substantially affect interstate 
commerce.”30 Further, regardless of arguments that the waters’ effects 
on interstate commerce may be too attenuated to fall within Congress’ 
commerce powers, the regulated activities themselves affect interstate 
commerce. The language of the CWRA is structured to extend 
jurisdiction both to waters affecting commerce and to waters where 
“activities affecting these waters[] are subject to the legislative power of 
Congress under the Constitution.”31 
Should the Supreme Court have the opportunity to review the 
CWRA, the Act should not be invalidated. Passage of the CWRA would 
be constitutional. However, substantial public policy arguments cut 
against the Act in its present form. The Act’s implementation would 
affect interstate commerce, and the effect could be detrimental both to 
local governments and to the private sector. Economic implications are 
unknown but may well be substantial.32 Other than retaining the 
exemptions to § 404 included in the CWA,33 the CWRA does not 
                                                                                                                     
 26. The Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007: Hearing Before the S. Environment and 
Public Works Comm., 110th Cong. 6 (2008) (statement of David Brand, County Sanitary 
Engineer, Madison County, Ohio).  
 27. See Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1870 Before the S. Comm. on 
Environment and Public Works, 110th Cong. 9 (2008) (testimony of Randall Smith, on behalf of 
the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association).  
 28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 29. See generally Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 
(2001); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 30. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). 
 31. CWRA, supra note 8, § 4(25). 
 32. CWRA CBO Cost Estimate, supra note 11, at 2. 
 33. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(13)(A) (“[N]othing in this Act modifies or otherwise affects 
5
Lingle: The Constitutionality and Economic Impacts of Federal Jurisdictio
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
1096 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
address potential economic harm caused by increased permitting 
jurisdiction. Land developers, farmers, and ranchers have all attested 
that they will be harmed by the CWRA,34 yet have provided no data to 
support this claim. Part V of this Note addresses the uncertainty of the 
CWRA’s economic impacts. Until more substantiated economic data is 
developed and considered, passage of the CWRA is unwise. The Act 
clarifies the constitutional scope of federal jurisdiction but has an 
imprudent “wait and see” approach to economic costs. 
This Note concludes that more research must be done before CWRA 
passage would be appropriate. Supporters are not considering economic 
costs, and opponents are not considering environmental costs.35 
Bringing federal jurisdiction back to pre-2001 levels would have 
predictable economic impacts; the impacts would be comparable to 
those actually demonstrated prior to the Supreme Court’s 2001 
curtailment of jurisdiction.36 However, the CWRA arguably expands 
jurisdiction beyond pre-2001 levels. A responsible Congress would 
attempt to better ascertain additional costs before taking this step. 
II.   WETLANDS 
Wetlands are “those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface 
or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and 
that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation 
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.”37 The Corps 
evaluates the presence of three factors when judging whether an area 
constitutes a wetland: hydrophytic plants, hydric soil, and wetland 
hydrology.38 As detailed in Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Rapanos 
concurrence, the Corps looks to: 
(1) [The] prevalence of plant species typically adapted to 
saturated soil conditions . . . ; (2) hydric soil, meaning soil 
that is saturated, flooded, or ponded for sufficient time 
during the growing season to become anaerobic . . . ; and 
(3) wetland hydrology, a term generally requiring 
continuous inundation or saturation to the surface during at 
                                                                                                                     
[CWA and prior CWA amendments] that exempted certain activities, such as farming, 
silviculture, and ranching activities, as well as agricultural stormwater discharges and return 
flows from oil, gas, and mining operations and irrigated agriculture, from particular permitting 
requirements.”). 
 34. See sources cited supra notes 22 and 27. 
 35. See sources cited supra notes 22–23 and 25–27. 
 36. See Sunding & Zilberman, supra note 6, at 74–75.  
 37. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2005), quoted in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 761 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 38. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 761 (citing U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, WETLANDS RESEARCH 
PROGRAM TECHNICAL REPORT Y-87-1 (online edition) 12–34 (1987), http://el.erdc.usace.army.m  
il/elpubs/pdf/wlman87.pdf (last visited May 15, 2010)). 
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least five percent of the growing season in most years.39 
There are four general categories of wetlands found in the United 
States: marshes, swamps, bogs, and fens.40 Marshes are tidal (coastal) or 
nontidal (inland) wetlands containing herbaceous vegetation dependent 
on saturated soil conditions.41 Examples include freshwater marshes, 
wet meadows, wet prairies, prairie potholes, playas, and vernal pools.42 
Whereas marshes are dominated by herbaceous vegetation, swamps are 
characterized by trees and shrubs.43 Swamps, which occur both in 
freshwater and saltwater conditions, are further characterized as forested 
swamps, shrub swamps, and mangrove swamps.44 Bogs are 
“characterized by spongy peat deposits, a growth of evergreen trees and 
shrubs, and a floor covered by a thick carpet of sphagnum moss.”45 
Examples include northern bogs and pocosins.46 Fens are also 
characterized by peat deposits, but they differ from bogs in that they are 
richer in nutrients and less acidic.47  
Wetlands serve valuable ecological functions and are integral to a 
healthy ecosystem.48 They prevent damage to neighboring lands by 
providing conveyance and storage of flood waters.49 Coastal wetlands 
are barriers to waves,50 serving as “‘horizontal levees’ that . . . absorb 
storm surges.”51 Both inland and along the coast, wetlands serve to 
prevent erosion and help with sediment control.52 Another benefit is 
pollution control: “Wetlands act as settling ponds and remove excess 
nutrients and other pollutants by filtering and causing chemical 
breakdown of pollutants.”53 Wetlands also serve as habitats for fish and 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Id. Anaerobic soil is the cause of the repugnant smell often associated with wetlands. 
Bacteria which thrive in the oxygen-free soil emanate the rotten-egg odor of hydrogen-sulfide. 
See THEDA BRADDOCK, WETLANDS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ECOLOGY, THE LAW, AND PERMITTING 
5 (2d ed. 2007). 
 40. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TYPES OF WETLANDS (2001) http://www.epa.gov/owow/w 
etlands/pdf/types.pdf 1–2 (last visited May 7, 2010). 
 41. Id. at 1.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 2.  
 45. Id..  
 46. Id. 
 47. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Wetlands: Fens, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/types/ 
fen.html (last visited May 7, 2010). 
 48. KUSLER &  OPHEIM, supra note 1, at 5–10. 
 49. Id. at 5. As noted in the Introduction, one acre of wetland flooded to one foot can hold 
up to 330,000 gallons of water—water that would flood neighboring parcels if the wetland were 
not present. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Sandra Zellmer, A Tale of Two Imperiled Rivers: Reflections from a Post-Katrina 
World, 59 FLA. L. REV. 599, 610 (2007) (citing Oliver Houck, Can We Save New Orleans?, 19 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 35 (2006)). 
 52. KUSLER &  OPHEIM, supra note 1, at 5. 
 53. Id. at 7. 
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wildlife, provide water based recreation, and contribute to surface water 
supply and aquifer recharge.54  
When the first European settlers began to emigrate to what is now 
the United States, they came to a land containing approximately 393 
million acres of wetlands.55 From the colonial days through the mid-
20th  Century, wetlands were considered foul, malarial areas that 
prevented land from being properly utilized for crop cultivation or 
development.56 Prompted by governmental acquiescence and even 
actual encouragement of wetland destruction,57 by 1954, half of the 
United States’ wetlands had been destroyed by drainage, fill, and 
construction.58 In the decades leading up to the CWA’s 1972 passage, 
the rate of wetland destruction in the United States was approximately 
460,000 acres per year.59 Following the passage of the CWA and later 
aided by the “no net loss” policy promulgated during the first President 
Bush’s administration,60 a reverse in the trend has led to a net increase 
of 32,000 acres of wetlands from 1988 to 2004.61 However, this trend is 
jeopardized by the Supreme Court’s recent § 404 jurisprudence. 
III.   THE CLEAN WATER ACT, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE CLEAN 
WATER RESTORATION ACT OF 2009: A BRIEF HISTORY 
A. The Clean Water Act and § 404 Permitting 
To “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters,” the 92nd Congress passed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, popularly known as 
the Clean Water Act.62 The CWA regulates the addition of pollutants to 
jurisdictional waters.63 Section 404 concerns the permitting 
requirements for adding dredged or fill material into such waters64 and 
is applicable to wetlands because fill material is considered a pollutant 
pursuant to § 502.65 In continuance of its role in dredge and fill 
                                                                                                                     
 54. Id. at 6–7. 
 55. BRADDOCK, supra note 39, at 6. Of these 393 acres, approximately 220 million were 
in the lower, coterminous forty-eight states. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. In the mid-19th Century, Congress passed the Swamp Lands Act, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519 
(1850) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 981–94 (2006)), granting to states the right to “reclaim” 
wetlands to reduce flooding destruction and mosquito havens. BRADDOCK, supra note 39, at 6. 
 58. KUSLER &  OPHEIM, supra note 1, at 3. 
 59. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 471. 
 60. Id. at 470. 
 61. Id. at 471. 
 62. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). 
 63. Id. § 1362(6) (“The term ‘pollutant’ means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator 
residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, 
radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and 
industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.”). 
 64. Id. § 1344. 
 65. Id. § 1362(6). 
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permitting under a CWA precursor, the Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriation Act of 1899,66 the Army Corps of Engineers exercises 
CWA authority to issue § 404 permits.67 The EPA, however, reserves an 
oversight and advisory function and may overrule a Corps decision 
granting a permit.68 During the early years of the CWA, the Corps and 
the EPA disagreed regarding the scope of § 404 jurisdiction.69 Whereas 
the Corps maintained jurisdiction should be limited to discharges 
intended either to change an aquatic area into a non-aquatic area or to 
raise the elevation of an aquatic bed, the EPA held that all solid waste 
discharges should be included, regardless of the intent or effect of the 
discharge.70 In 1986, the two agencies entered into an agreement on the 
matter, in which a discharge of fill material would be considered 
jurisdictional if: 
(a) The discharge has as its primary purpose or has as one 
principle purpose of multi-purposes to replace a 
portion of the waters of the United States with dry 
land or to raise the bottom elevation[,] 
(b) The discharge results from activities such as road 
construction or other activities where the material to 
be discharged is generally identified with 
construction-type activities[,] 
(c) A principal effect of the discharge is physical loss or 
physical modification of waters of the United States, 
including smothering of aquatic life or habitat[, or] 
(d) The discharge is heterogeneous in nature and of the 
type normally associated with sanitary landfill 
discharges.71 
The Corps’ early understanding of the CWA confined its authority to 
the waters covered by the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 
1899: “[N]avigable waters, including waters subject to the ebb and flow 
of the tides, waters which are or have been used to transport interstate 
commerce, tidal flats under navigable waters, and the natural 
meandering of rivers.”72 However, as a result of a citizen suit in Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway,73 the Corps expanded its 
                                                                                                                     
 66. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401–18 (2006). For information on the Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriation Act of 1899, see Zellmer, supra note 51, at 612. 
 67. BRADDOCK, supra note 39, at 44. 
 68. Id. at 44 n.10 (citing Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of the 
Army and the Environmental Protection Agency Concerning Determination of the Geographic 
Jurisdiction of the Section 404 Program and the Application of Exceptions Under Section 404(f) 
of the Clean Water Act (Jan. 19, 1989)). 
 69. Id. at 45. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Memorandum of Agreement on Solid Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. 8871 (Mar. 14, 1986). 
 72. BRADDOCK, supra note 39, at 44 n.12. 
 73. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).  
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interpretation of jurisdictional waters to include wetlands.74 
Consequently, regulations promulgated after Callaway explicitly 
reference wetlands.75 This jurisdictional expansion withstood Supreme 
Court review in one decision,76 only to be dramatically curtailed in later 
decisions.77 
B.  The Supreme Court and § 404 Permitting 
1.  United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,78 the Supreme 
Court addressed whether the CWA “authorizes the Corps to 
require . . . permits . . . before discharging fill material into wetlands 
adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributaries.”79 The Court 
noted that the Corps’ interpretation of CWA jurisdiction should be 
afforded deference so long as it was not unreasonable and did not 
contravene congressional intent.80 The Court also acknowledged that 
“[i]n determining the limits of its power to regulate [wetland] 
discharges under the Act, the Corps must necessarily choose some point 
at which water ends and land begins.”81 Looking to the CWA’s 
legislative history and its underlying ecological policies, the Court 
found the Corps’ asserted jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to 
navigable waters not unreasonable, and therefore legitimate.82 Further, 
adjacent wetlands were covered by the CWA even when the wetlands 
were not flooded by or permeated by the adjacent waters.83 Wetlands 
adjacent to navigable waters “may function as integral parts of the 
aquatic environment even when the moisture creating the wetlands does 
not find its source in the adjacent bodies of water.”84 The Court noted 
that though the CWA did not explicitly mention wetlands, “a refusal by 
Congress to overrule an agency’s construction of legislation is at least 
some evidence of the reasonableness of that construction, particularly 




                                                                                                                     
 74. BRADDOCK, supra note 39, at 44 n.12. 
 75. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(2) (2009). 
 76. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985). 
 77. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006) (plurality opinion); SWANCC, 
531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).  
 78. 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
 79. Id. at 123. 
 80. Id. at 131. 
 81. Id. at 132. 
 82. Id. at 132–35. 
 83. Id. at 134–35. 
 84. Id. at 135. 
 85. Id. at 137. 
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2.  Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers 
In 2001, the Supreme Court revisited the scope of § 404 jurisdiction 
in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (SWANCC).86 In SWANCC, the Corps tried to exert 
jurisdiction over an abandoned sand and gravel pit containing isolated, 
non-navigable, intrastate, “permanent and seasonal ponds.”87 The Corps 
premised its jurisdiction on the fact that several species of migratory 
birds frequented the isolated waters.88 Pursuant to the Corps’ Migratory 
Bird Rule, this served as the requisite link to interstate commerce, thus 
validating CWA jurisdiction.89 Not persuaded, the Court struck down 
the Migratory Bird Rule as not within the scope of CWA authority.90 
After SWANCC, the Corps could still exert jurisdiction over navigable 
waters, tributaries to navigable waters, wetlands adjacent to navigable 
waters, and wetlands adjacent to the tributaries of navigable waters.91 
However, the Corps lost the authority to regulate isolated, non-
navigable, intrastate waters. 
3.  Rapanos v. United States 
The Supreme Court’s most recent word on the scope of the Corps’ 
§ 404 permitting authority came in 2006 with Rapanos v. United 
States.92 The Court in Rapanos could not garner the requisite five votes 
for a majority opinion but rather produced a four-member plurality 
penned by Justice Antonin Scalia93 nd a concurrence penned by Justice 
Kennedy.94 The opinions proved complex and confusing, and produced 
uncertainty on what the post-Rapanos standard for § 404 jurisdiction 
precisely is.95 Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion cabined jurisdiction to 
“relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of 
water”96 and “wetlands with a continuous surface connection” to those 
waters.97 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, on the other hand, found all 
waters possessing a “significant nexus” to navigable waters to be 
                                                                                                                     
 86. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 87. Id. at 162–63. 
 88. Id. at 164–65. 
 89. Id. at 173. The Corps also justified the Migratory Bird Rule because it protected the 
“habitat [of] birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties.” Id. at 164. 
 90. Id. at 174. 
 91. For a summary of Corps jurisdiction following SWANCC, see BRADDOCK, supra note 
39, at 39–40. 
 92. 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 93. Id. at 719–57 (plurality opinion). 
 94. Id. at 759–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 95. For information on case law following the Rapanos decision, see U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, Post-Rapanos Caselaw, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/Post-RapanosCaselaw 
6407.pdf (last visited May 16, 2010). 
 96. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739 (plurality opinion). 
 97. Id. at 742. 
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jurisdictional waters.98 He understood this nexus to be determinable 
only on a case-by-case basis.99 Writing for the dissent, Justice John Paul 
Stevens noted that since the four dissenting Justices would uphold 
jurisdiction in all waters included in either Justice Scalia’s or Justice 
Kennedy’s test, satisfaction of either test should validate jurisdiction.100 
Interpreting this decision has proven less than workable, leading to 
disparate standards and frustration among the courts, the Corps, and the 
regulated community.101  
C.  The Clean Water Restoration Act of 2009 
The Clean Water Restoration Act of 2009 amends the CWA “by 
striking ‘navigable waters of the United States’ each place it appears 
and inserting ‘waters of the United States.’”102 Importantly, the CWRA 
expressly exerts federal jurisdiction over all intrastate waters, language 
not found in the 1972 CWA.103 Under the CWRA, jurisdictional waters 
would include  
[A]ll waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, the 
territorial seas, and all interstate and intrastate waters and 
their tributaries, including lakes, rivers, streams (including 
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, 
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, 
natural ponds, and all impoundments of the foregoing, to 
the fullest extent that these waters, or activities affecting 
these waters, are subject to the legislative power of 
Congress under the Constitution.104 
Whereas the original CWA ambiguously asserted jurisdiction over 
“navigable waters,” defined only as “the waters of the United States, 
including the territorial seas,”105 the CWRA language is explicit and 
closely follows the pre-Rapanos Army Corps of Engineers delineation 
of covered waters found in 33 C.F.R. § 383.3.106 
                                                                                                                     
 98. Id. at 779–80 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 99. Id. at 782. 
 100. Id. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 101. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 95. 
 102. CWRA, supra note 8, § 5(1). 
 103. Id. § 4(25). 
 104. Id. 
 105. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006). 
106. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1-7) (2009). 
For the purpose of this regulation these terms are defined as follows: (a) The 
term waters of the United States means (1) All waters which are currently used, 
or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign 
commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the 
tide; (2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands; (3) All other waters 
such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), 
mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa 
lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could 
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Section 3 of the CWRA states that jurisdiction will be returned to 
those waters covered before the Rapanos and SWANCC opinions.107 
However, the language of the Act would arguably permit jurisdiction to 
extend beyond those earlier levels. Additionally, the CWRA retains the 
numerous exemptions included in the original CWA.108 These include, 
among others, exemptions for most “normal farming, silviculture, and 
ranching activities, such as plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor 
drainage, harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and forest 
products, or upland soil and water conservation practices.”109 The 
uncertainty in how far beyond pre-Rapanos levels CWRA jurisdiction 
would extend has been one of the main concerns regarding the Act’s 
passage.110 
IV.   THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND § 404 PERMITTING 
A.  The Commerce Clause 
Pursuant to its commerce power,111 Congress may enact laws 
regulating 1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce”; 2) “the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in 
interstate commerce”; and 3) “those activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.”112 Many of the waters covered by the CWRA 
constitute “channels of interstate commerce” or “things in interstate 
commerce.”113 Federal control of these waters, all under federal 
jurisdiction at least since 1972, is constitutional. The possible 
Commerce Clause complications stem from CWRA authority over 
waters not previously enumerated by Congress, such as “intrastate 
lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, 
sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa 
                                                                                                                     
affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters: (i) Which are 
or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other 
purposes; or (ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in 
interstate or foreign commerce; or (iii) Which are used or could be used for 
industrial purpose by industries in interstate commerce; (4) All impoundments 
of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United States under the definition; 
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this 
section; (6) The territorial seas; (7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than 
waters that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6) 
of this section. 
Id. 
 107. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(8). 
 108. Id. § 6. 
 109. Id. § 6(3). 
 110. See supra notes 22, 25–27 and accompanying text. 
111. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that “The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o 
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States”). 
 112. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). 
 113. See id. at 558. 
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lakes, [] natural ponds[,] . . . [and their] tributaries.”114 To survive 
judicial scrutiny, a government defendant would need to demonstrate 
that these intrastate waters “substantially affect interstate commerce.”115 
The following paragraphs will demonstrate that most, if not all, of these 
waters satisfy this criterion and are thus within Congress’ commerce 
power. 
The Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on potential 
Commerce Clause restraints to federal regulation of wetlands. In all 
three of the Court’s § 404 opinions, the decision turned on the Corps’ 
statutory interpretation, not the statute’s constitutionality.116 For 
example, in SWANCC, the petitioners asked the Court whether § 404 
extended to an intrastate sand and gravel pit with “a scattering of 
permanent and seasonal ponds,” and if so, “whether Congress could 
exercise such authority consistent with the Commerce Clause.”117 The 
Court found § 404 did not extend to such waters, and thereby avoided 
the constitutional issue.118 
Again in 2006, rather than making a judgment on Congress’ 
commerce powers, the Court invalidated a § 404 implementation 
scheme on statutory interpretation grounds.119 Justice Kennedy signaled, 
however, that the Commerce Clause is a potential factor in wetlands 
regulation controversies.120 Justice Kennedy found that the CWA 
granted federal jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact 
waters and to wetlands having a “significant nexus” to nonnavigable 
tributaries.121 He stated that “[t]his interpretation of the Act does not 
raise federalism or Commerce Clause concerns sufficient to support a 
presumption against its adoption.”122 He added that in “most cases 
regulation of wetlands that are adjacent to tributaries and possess a 
significant nexus with navigable waters will raise no serious 
constitutional or federalism difficulty.”123 Justice Kennedy stated that 
his “significant nexus” test should preclude unconstitutional extensions 
of the CWA.124 This indicates that, regardless of whether Congress 
amends the CWA with the CWRA, waters failing to have a “significant 
nexus” to navigable waters or nonnavigable tributaries to navigable 
                                                                                                                     
 114. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(8)(C), (E). 
 115. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59. 
 116. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738–39 (2006) (plurality opinion); 
SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 
121, 131 (1985).  
 117. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162–63. 
 118. Id. at 162. 
 119. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738–39 (plurality opinion). 
 120. Id. at 777, 782–83 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 121. Id. at 782. Navigable-in-fact waters are those waters that are actually navigable. This 
phrase distinguishes these waters from the broad array of waters considered “navigable waters” 
per the CWA, many of which are not actually navigable. 
 122. Id. (emphasis added). 
 123. Id. (emphasis added). 
 124. Id. at 783. 
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waters will likely raise Commerce Clause issues for Justice Kennedy. 
Given that Justice Kennedy often serves as a swing vote, this could 
prove determinative should the CWRA be contested under the current 
or a similar makeup of the Court. 
Justice Kennedy’s presentiment is unfortunate. Though advocating a 
case-by-case analysis of whether a wetland’s adjacency to nonnavigable 
tributaries establishes a “significant nexus,”125 Justice Kennedy stated 
“mere hydrologic connection should not suffice in all cases.”126 He 
further noted that “the connection may be too insubstantial for the 
hydrologic linkage to establish the required nexus with navigable waters 
as traditionally understood.”127 
However, waters that lack a “significant nexus” to navigable-in-fact 
waters yet have hydrologic connections to navigable waters may 
cumulatively affect interstate commerce. Justice Kennedy himself 
stated, “‘[W]hen a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation 
to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising 
under that statute is of no consequence.’”128 Justice Kennedy drew this 
from Gonzalez v. Raich,129 a 2005 Supreme Court decision reaffirming 
the Wickard v. Filburn130 principal that proper Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence looks to the impacts of activities in the aggregate.131 
Accordingly, CWRA waters’ aggregate effect on interstate commerce 
may open the door for Congress’ commerce power, despite the lack of a 
“significant nexus” in specific instances. As Professor William Buzbee 
                                                                                                                     
 125. Id. at 782. 
 126. Id. at 784. Hydrologic connectivity refers to the movement of water from one location 
to another within the same hydrologic cycle. Catherine Pringle, What is Hydrologic Connectivity 
and Why Is It Ecologically Important? http://cpringle.myweb.uga.edu/hydroconn.html (last 
visited July 11, 2010). If such movement is possible between two bodies of water, the two 
bodies would be hydrologically connected.   
 127. Id. at 784–85. 
 128. Id. at 783 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005)). 
 129. 545 U.S. 1. 
 130. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 131. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17. In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the 
Supreme Court stated, “While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the 
effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation’s 
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that 
activity is economic in nature.” Id. at 613. The commerce impacting functions of wetlands 
arguably give wetlands an economic nature. S e infra text accompanying notes 143–51. Should 
wetlands be considered not “economic in nature,” however, Morrison might cut against 
aggregating wetlands’ effects on interstate commerce. Se  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. But the 
fact that the Court chose not to “adopt a categorical rule” suggests aggregation has not been 
definitively foreclosed. See id. Further, in a four-Justice dissent to Morrison, Justice Souter 
noted that “Wickard applied an aggregate effects test to ostensibly domestic, noncommercial 
farming,” and that an “attempt to distinguish between primary activities affecting commerce in 
terms of the relatively commercial or noncommercial character of the primary conduct 
proscribed comes with the pedigree of near tragedy . . . .” Id at 641 (Souter, J., dissenting). The 
issue, therefore, is not settled. A slight shift in the Court’s make-up could push the dissenting 
position into the majority, thus making an aggregation of wetlands’ effects on interstate 
commerce more clearly appropriate. 
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attested during congressional hearings on the 2007 CWRA, due to the 
“aggregate importance of often small types of waters and possibly 
individually small environmental harms that in aggregate can be 
substantial, the [CWRA] is on sound footing.”132 
Wetlands play an essential role in watershed hydrology, which in the 
aggregate affects interstate commerce. These waters reduce sediment 
and toxic pollutant buildup in adjacent waters, serve as habitat for 
aquatic animals, reduce downstream flooding,133 and contribute to 
nutrient recycling.134 None of the commerce-impacting functions of 
wetlands discriminate between waters with a “mere hydrologic 
connection”135 to navigable waters and waters with a “significant 
nexus” to such waters. Though the effect on interstate commerce may 
be de minimis compared to the impact from wetlands adjacent to 
navigable-in-fact waters or those bearing a “significant nexus” to 
nonnavigable tributaries, the effect is still present, and in the aggregate, 
may “substantially affect interstate commerce.”136 
As discussed above, effects on commerce are not found exclusively 
in waters with hydrologic connections to navigable waters; wholly 
“intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), 
mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, 
playa lakes, [] natural ponds[,] . . . [and their] tributaries”137 also 
“substantially affect interstate commerce.”138  Like the CWA before it, 
the CWRA would “establish[] a uniform baseline for the protection of 
the nation’s waters, . . . ensur[ing] that all states and communities start 
from a level playing field with respect to water quality standards.”139 
Further, the CWRA, like its predecessor the CWA, would  
attempt[] to avoid the potential for states with differing 
water quality standards to be at competitive disadvantages 
for encouraging economic growth, but rather [would] 
facilitate[] states interested in establishing stricter water 
quality standards to do so, without the fear that they will be 
placed at a competitive disadvantage to neighboring 
states.140 
This “[f]ederal floor”141 would prevent a race to the bottom in wetlands 
regulation and allow those states whose industries are affected by 
                                                                                                                     
 132. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, upra note 5, at 225 (testimony of William W. 
Buzbee, Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law). 
 133. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. at 790. 
 135. Id. at 784 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 136. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). 
 137. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(8)(C), (E). 
 138. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. 
 139. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, supra note 5, at viii. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at vii. 
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wetlands regulations to engage in interstate commerce from an initially 
“level playing field.”142 
Anticipating contentions from the detractors of federal regulation of 
wetlands, the CWRA drafters included numerous connections to 
interstate commerce.143 For example, the CWRA references the effects 
on interstate commerce caused by pollution.144 Wetlands are a valuable 
source of water filtration and purification.145 This pollution mitigation is 
thwarted when wetlands are drained or filled. Without § 404 permitting 
for CWRA waters, the draining or filling of wholly intrastate wetlands 
likely occurs without consideration of such factors. This affects 
interstate commerce. The CWRA also notes the exacerbation of flood 
damage caused by the draining or filling of wetlands, and the 
consequent effects on interstate commerce.146 Concerning downstream 
flooding, Justice Stevens noted in his Rapanos dissent that, “‘There is 
no constitutional reason why Congress cannot, under the commerce 
power, treat the watersheds as a key to flood control on navigable 
streams and their tributaries.’”147 Further, wetlands and streams play a 
part in filtering drinking water supplies.148 With ever increasing demand 
for this commodity,149 the effects on interstate commerce will become 
increasingly pronounced. In addition to these pervasive effects on 
interstate commerce, the CWRA notes the importance of wetlands and 
other intrastate waters with respect to “waterfowl hunting, bird 
watching, fishing, and photography”150 and the correlated impacts on 
“the travel, tourism, recreation, and sporting sectors of the economy of 
                                                                                                                     
 142. Id. at viii; see also Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (holding that “[a]pplication of the [Endangered Species Act] to habitat degradation has a 
further impact on interstate commerce by removing the incentives for states ‘to adopt lower 
standards of endangered species protection in order to attract development,’ thereby preventing 
a destructive ‘race to the bottom’”). In addition, see Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and 
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981), which justified federal surface mining and 
reclamation standards by noting that “[t]he prevention of . . . destructive interstate competition 
is a traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce Clause.” Though H del was 
treated unfavorably by the Lopez Court, 514 U.S. at 557–59, the federal floor to prevent 
destructive interstate competition rationale was not overruled. This rationale, then, could be 
used to demonstrate a rational basis for Congress using its commerce power to enact the 
CWRA. 
 143. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(19)–(25). 
 144. Id. § 3(19). 
 145. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2) (2009). 
 146. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(21)(B). 
 147. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 803–04 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 525 (1941)). 
 148. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(22)–(23). 
 149. As population growth, pollution, and increased consumption will likely create greater 
demand for water, “One of the defining issues of the twenty-first century will be the allocation 
of fresh water supplies.” Christine A. Klein, Mary Jane Angelo & Richard Hamann, 
Modernizing Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA. L. REV. 403, 404 (2009). 
 150. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(24)(A). 
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the United States.”151 The fact that there are non-economic reasons for 
Congress to expand its CWA jurisdiction is not fatal to the CWRA.152 
Inclusive in “the national objective of restoring and maintaining the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”153 
are commerce-affecting factors, and these factors put the CWRA within 
Congress’ commerce powers. 
To contravene arguments that the aforementioned effects on 
interstate commerce are too attenuated or insubstantial, paragraph 
twenty-five of the CWRA illustrates an undeniable effect on interstate 
commerce.154 It states, “[A]ctivities that result in the discharge of 
pollutants into waters of the United States are commercial or economic 
in nature, and, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.”155 The CWRA is an amendment to a water quality statute, 
but the § 404 permitting over those waters is a regulatory section of the 
statute156 and thus inextricably linked to commerce. A fair reading of 
the CWRA demonstrates Congress’ unambiguous intent to regulate both 
commerce-impacting waters and waters affected by “activities that 
result in the discharge of pollutants” into waters.157 Both the waters and 
the activities affecting those waters have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce and therefore are within Congress’ commerce 
powers. 
The CWRA amended CWA may be compared to the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA) and its § 9 “take” permits.158 Each Act taken as a 
whole regulates a natural resource, while the provisions on permitting 
requirements (§ 404 and § 9, respectively) regulate what is typically 
commercial activity.159 In Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton,160 the 
petitioner real estate development company contended that application 
of the ESA contravened the Commerce Clause.161 In finding to the 
contrary, the D.C. Circuit noted that “the rationale upon which [to] rely 
focuses on the activity that the federal government seeks to regulate,”162 
as opposed to the object of the regulation. The court explained that 
[the] regulated activity is Rancho Viejo’s planned 
commercial development, not the arroyo toad that it 
                                                                                                                     
 151. Id. § 3(24)(B). 
 152. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964) 
(“Congress was not restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce 
with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and social wrong.”). 
 153. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(3). 
 154. Id. § 3(25). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). 
 157. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(25). 
 158. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006). 
 159. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006); 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006). 
 160. 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 161. Id. at 1064. 
 162. Id. at 1069. 
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threatens. The ESA does not purport to tell toads what they 
may or may not do. Rather, section 9 limits the taking of 
listed species, and its prohibitions and corresponding 
penalties apply to the persons who do the taking, not to the 
species that are taken.163  
A similar rationale in a CWRA amended § 404 context would focus on 
the effects on interstate commerce of the “activities that result in the 
discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States”164 rather than 
solely the effects caused by the waters themselves. 
It should be noted that in SWANCC, the Supreme Court seemed 
uncomfortable basing CWA jurisdiction on the commerce impacts of 
the regulated activity rather than solely on the commerce impacts of the 
waters.165 Concerning the Corps basis of jurisdiction on the commercial 
impacts associated with viewing migratory birds, Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist stated: 
These arguments raise significant constitutional questions.  
For example, we would have to evaluate the precise object 
or activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects 
interstate commerce. This is not clear, for although the 
Corps has claimed jurisdiction over petitioner’s land 
because it contains water areas used as habitat by migratory 
birds, respondents now, post litem motam, focus upon the 
fact that the regulated activity is petitioner’s municipal 
landfill, which is “plainly of a commercial nature.” But this 
is a far cry, indeed, from the “navigable waters” and 
“waters of the United States” to which the statute by its 
terms extends.166  
This dictum was supported by Justice Kennedy, the crucial vote 
should the current Court address Commerce Clause implications of the 
CWRA.167 However, the Court has not always focused its Commerce 
Clause analysis solely on the thing to be protected.168 During 
congressional hearings on the 2007 CWRA, Professor Buzbee pointed 
out that “in the Supreme Court’s major Commerce Clause decisions in 
                                                                                                                     
 163. Id. at 1072. It is interesting to note that in 2003 while sitting on the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals, Chief Justice John Roberts dissented in an order denying the Rancho Viejo 
petitioner a rehearing en banc. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 
2003). Roberts noted that Rancho Viejo seemed inconsistent with Lopez. Id. However, in any 
future Supreme Court decision on the Commerce Clause and environmental regulation, Chief 
Justice Roberts is not likely to be the pivotal vote. 
 164. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(25). 
 165. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s SWANCC opinion garnered the support of Justices 
Kennedy, Scalia, Sandra Day O’Connor, and Clarence Thomas. Id. at 161.  
 168. See infra notes 169–71 and accompanying text. 
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recent years, it has focused at times on the thing to be protected, while 
at other times focused on the nature of the activity that would, if not 
regulated, cause harm.”169 Buzbee noted that while the Court in Lopez 
focused on the commercial impacts of the thing to be protected (gun 
possession),170 “[i]n the later United States v. Morrison case, 529 U.S. 
598 (2000), the Court focused on the lack of a commercial aspect to 
violence against women.”171 
Perhaps in light of the disputes this distinction has caused, the 
CWRA drafters made sure that the Act would explicitly establish 
jurisdiction both over waters that have commercial impacts and waters 
affected by commercial activities.172 The Act states that the covered 
“‘waters of the United States’ means all waters subject to the ebb and 
flow of the tide, the territorial seas, and all interstate and intrastate 
waters . . . to the fullest extent that these waters, or activities affecting 
these waters, are subject to the legislative power of Congress under the 
Constitution.”173 Therefore, if an activity impacting interstate commerce 
affects CWRA waters, CWRA jurisdiction kicks in.174 No contention of 
an agency construing statutory directive post litem motam could be 
made. Additionally, the Act states that included in “‘waters of the 
United States’ [are] those features that were treated as such pursuant to 
the regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Corps 
of Engineers in existence before the dates of [SWANCC and 
Rapanos].” 175 This, of course, includes waters “the use, degradation, or 
destruction of which could affect interstate . . . commerce . . . .”176 
Therefore, whether the focus of Commerce Clause inquiry is on the 
particular waters added to federal protection under the CWRA or on the 
regulated activities that potentially degrade those waters, substantial 
effects on interstate commerce are present. As noted in Morrison, “in 
every case where we have sustained federal regulation under [Wickard’s 
                                                                                                                     
 169. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, upra note 5, at 225 (testimony of William W. 
Buzbee, Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law). 
 170. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995). 
 171. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, upra note 5, at 225 (testimony of William W. 
Buzbee, Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law). 
 172. CWRA, supra note 8, § 4(25). 
 173. Id. (emphasis added). 
 174. In addition to this explicit indication of the extent of CWRA jurisdiction, the entire 
Act is peppered with references to the “activities affecting these waters.” Id.; see also id. § 3(25) 
(“[A]ctivities that result in the discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States are 
commercial or economic in nature, and, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.”); id. § 3(28) (“[R]egulating activities affecting the waters of the United States is a 
necessary and proper means of implementing treaties . . . .”); id. § 3(32) (“[R]egulating activities 
affecting the waters of the United States is a necessary and proper means of protecting Federal 
land, including hundreds of millions of acres of parkland . . . .”); id. § 3(33) (“[R]egulating 
activities affecting the waters of the United States is necessary to protect Federal land and 
waters from discharges of pollutants and other forms of degradation.”). 
 175. Id. § 3(8). 
 176. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2009). 
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aggregation principle], the regulated activity was of an apparent 
commercial character.”177 This lends support to the view that the 
“activities that result in the discharge of pollutants into waters”178 could 
legitimately be the focus of Commerce Clause analysis. If the focus 
should be solely the waters, however, the aforementioned connections 
to interstate commerce substantiate the rational basis for an exercise of 
Congress’ commerce powers.179 
An honest Court would give the CWRA the “‘presumption of 
constitutionality’” owed congressional legislation.180 The Act is crafted 
to “reach[] both activities that are economic or commercial causing 
harms to specified sorts of waters, and also protect[] waters that are 
themselves of economic or commercial significance individually or in 
the aggregate.”181 Indeed, “[t]hese are sound, core sorts of justifications 
for federal constitutional power.”182 Though the CWRA may extend to 
the limits of Congress’ commerce powers, Congress has every right to 
craft such legislation. They have done so with the CWRA, issuing both 
a “‘clear and manifest’ statement”183 of federal jurisdiction, and 
referencing the commerce-impacting factors that legitimize it.184
B.  State Sovereignty and the Clean Water Restoration Act of 2009 
Despite the substantial effects that wetlands and wetlands regulation 
have on interstate commerce, critics will undoubtedly argue that the 
CWRA would “result in a significant impingement of the States’ 
                                                                                                                     
 177. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 n.4 (2000) (emphasis added and internal 
citation omitted). 
 178. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(25). 
 179. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964) (“[W]here we find that the 
legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a 
chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an 
end.”). Further, in evaluating the effects on interstate commerce, a broad interpretation of 
economic activity should be used. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 491 (4th Cir. 2000). In 
Gibbs, the court noted that: 
Although the connection to economic or commercial activity plays a central 
role in whether a regulation will be upheld under the Commerce Clause, 
economic activity must be understood in broad terms. Indeed, a cramped view 
of commerce would cripple a foremost federal power and in so doing would 
eviscerate national authority. 
Id. 
 180. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607). 
 181. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, upra note 5, at 224 (testimony of William W. 
Buzbee, Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law).  
 182. Id.  
 183. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (plurality opinion) (quoting 
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994)). 
 184. CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(19)–(25). 
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traditional and primary power over land and water use.”185 In striking 
down the wetland permitting scheme applied to the Rapanos petitioners, 
Justice Scalia noted that “[r]egulation of land use, as through the 
issuance of the development permits sought by petitioners . . . , is a 
quintessential state and local power.”186 The fact that thirty-three states 
and the District of Columbia favored the Corps’ interpretation of federal 
jurisdiction did not influence Justice Scalia.187 Rather, he stated that it 
“makes no difference . . . that some States wish to unburden 
themselves” of their “responsibilities and rights” concerning wetlands 
regulation.188 
Justice Scalia’s opinion, however, does not consider the effects that 
one state’s waters will have on another state’s waters. These effects are 
more pronounced for, though not limited to, waters within the same 
hydrologic cycle as waters in a bordering state. As noted in Part IV.A., 
all of these waters are not included in Justice Kennedy’s “significant 
nexus” test.189 Without federal water standards, states may exercise their 
own power over land and water use yet are powerless to prevent water 
degradation caused by bordering states with laxer standards. One might 
point out that this argument could be used concerning any land and 
water regulation. States are at least indirectly affected by many 
regulations of neighboring states. However, water is different from 
other traditionally state-regulated issues because water is in constant 
motion. Land, for the most part, is not. Recognition of hydrologic cycles 
played a part in the drafting of both the CWA and the CWRA190 and it 
plays a part in understanding the drawback of relying on a “patchwork 
of state water pollution control efforts.”191 
Recognizing the interconnectedness of waters, along with the 
consequent effects on interstate commerce, helps undermine the 
argument that the CWRA would “result in a significant 
impingement”192 of what should appropriately be state sovereignty. Less 
persuasive, however, is the justification that without federal regulation 
the states’ hands are tied. During hearings for the 2007 CWRA, the 
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Water Resources and 
Environment Majority Staff listed six concerns caused by the SWANCC 
and Rapanos decisions.193 The fourth concern raised this argument.194 
                                                                                                                     
 185. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001). However, “[t]he purported federal deference 
to state water law is not nearly as strong as one might think. The Supreme Court has not 
hesitated to find state law preempted when it interferes with federal navigational powers, flood 
control, hydropower, or vessel safety.” Zellmer, supra note 51, at 617. 
 186. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738 (plurality opinion) (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson 
Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767–68 n.30 (1982)). 
 187. Id. at 737 n.8. 
 188. Id. (Internal quote marks and external citation omitted). 
 189. Supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text. 
 190. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, supra note 5, at vii. 
 191. Id. 
 192. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001). 
 193. CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, supra note 5, at x. The six concerns raised were:  
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The Subcommittee noted that without federal jurisdiction and “in the 
absence of affirmative State legislative or administrative action to cover 
these waters,” the waters would not be covered.195 Though true, this is 
not sound justification for federal jurisdiction. If the states want waters 
regulated that are not covered by federal regulations, the states can 
implement legislative or administrative action to regulate those waters. 
This might be costly and burdensome, but it is not impossible. 
However, the Subcommittee continued by stating that  
[a]ccording to the Corps, “approximately [twenty-five] 
States have some limitations on their ability to establish 
environmental requirements that are more stringent than 
those called for under federal law. This ranges from 
notification requirements when programs proposed are 
more stringent, to strict prohibitions against state programs 
that are more stringent than the [Clean Water Act].” These 
so-called “no more stringent” rules limit the ability of 
certain states to assume responsibility for the protection of 
waterbodies and wetlands that were once covered under the 
Clean Water Act, and turn “federal floors into regulatory 
ceilings” for the protection of water quality.196 
However, the prohibition created by “no more stringent” rules is, at 
least in part, illusory. A state wishing to implement regulations covering 
waters not covered by the CWA would need to enact a bill with the 
support of, in most circumstances, 51% of its legislators. An extra 
hurdle would exist for a state with a “no more stringent” rule. In those 
cases, the legislature would need to either repeal or make an exception 
to the rule. Such action would likely require 51% of the legislators. 
                                                                                                                     
(1) Inconsistent Judicial Tests for Determining Jurisdiction; (2) Uncertainty and 
Delay in State and Local Construction Projects; (3) Impact on the Control of 
Point Sources of Pollution; (4) Obstacles for States to Address the 
SWANCC/Rapanos Coverage Gap; (5) Potential for States to Lose State Clean 
Water Act Funding; and (6) Implications of SWANCC/Rapanos on other 
Environmental Authorities. 
Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at xiv. 
 196. Id. at xiv (quoting U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR 
RAPANOS AND CARABELL DECISION 20 (2007), http://www.usace.army.mil/CECW/Documents/cec 
wo/reg/cwa_guide/rapanos_qa_06-05-07.pdf (last visited May 17, 2010); Andrew Hecht, Note, 
Obstacles to the Devolution of Environmental Protection: States’ Self-Imposed Limitations on 
Rulemaking, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. &  POL’Y F. 105, 113 (2004)). The source relied upon by the 
Subcommittee actually denotes twenty-seven states with “no more stringent” rules. Hecht, 
supra, at 116. Seventeen of the twenty-seven states have generally applicable “no more 
stringent” rules that apply to all water quality statutes. Id. Ten of the states have rules that apply 
to only certain areas of water quality regulation. Id. 
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Therefore, if a state has the political will to expand its regulatory 
scheme, it should have the political will to first disable a “no more 
stringent” rule. Of the twenty-seven states with “no more stringent” 
rules governing water quality, two such rules are executive orders, one 
is a binding policy statement, and the rest are statutes.197 None are 
mandated by state constitutional provisions. Accordingly, whereas 
political or budgetary factors may prevent a state from regulating waters 
not covered by federal regulations, no state is actually barred from 
increasing the scope of regulation. The Subcommittee’s reference to “no 
more stringent” rules in the congressional hearings for the 2007 CWRA 
could lead one to draw inaccurate conclusions.198 A more persuasive 
and honest argument focuses on the effects of a state’s degraded waters 
on neighboring states, as discussed above. 
V.  THE UNCERTAIN ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE CLEAN WATER 
RESTORATION ACT OF 2009 
Though the CWRA is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ 
commerce powers, in its present form, it lacks the clarity a prudent 
Congress would require. Insufficient time and resources have been 
spent on researching the economic impacts the Act would have on local 
governments and the private sector. The hundreds of pages of testimony 
reveal concern but do little to fill the gaps.199 Without numbers 
demonstrating what the costs will be, members of the regulated 
community are understandably worried.200 
As of the time of this Note’s publication, studies have not predicted 
how many additional applicants will come under Corps and EPA 
permitting jurisdiction should the scope of CWA waters be expanded. A 
2002 article from the Natural Resources Journal provided statistics on 
how much the permitting process costs individual applicants.201 Both 
the Rapanos Court in 2006 and testimony during CWRA hearings in 
2009 relied on this article for data on economic impacts,202 uggesting it 
is one of the few authoritative texts on the subject. However, the article 
provided no insight on how many additional applicants would be added 
                                                                                                                     
 197. Hecht, supra note 196, at 116. Wisconsin’s rule is a binding policy statement. 
Maryland and Pennsylvania have executive orders. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming have statutes. Id at 116 nn.42, 45–46.  
 198. See CWRA of 2007 House Hearings, supra note 5, at xiii–xv. 
 199. See sources cited supra notes 22 and 26–27. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Sunding & Zilberman, supra note 6, at 74–75. 
 202. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (plurality opinion) (“The 
average applicant for an individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the 
process, and the average applicant for a nationwide permit spends 313 days and $28,915—not 
counting costs of mitigation or design changes.”); Meeting the Needs of Small Businesses and 
Family Farmers in Regulating Our Nation’s Waters, H. Comm. on Small Business, 111th Cong. 
6 (2009) (statement of Trey Pebley, Vice President, McAllen Construction, Inc.). 
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under different statutory regimes—crucial information for honest debate 
on wetlands jurisdiction. 
Concerning the pending legislation on the CWRA, a 2009 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Cost Estimate noted that  
cost[s] . . . would be the additional costs of obtaining 
permits (or designing projects to avoid having to obtain a 
permit), net of any savings that would result from a 
modified permitting process. Information about the 
additional bodies of water that would be covered by the bill 
is scarce, and the number of activities that would require a 
permit is uncertain. Therefore, CBO has no basis for 
estimating . . . the cost of the [CWRA].203 
The CBO Cost Estimate also stated that decreased litigation would 
save the federal government an “insignificant” sum and that government 
permit receipts would likely increase by less than $100,000 per year.204 
In discussing the number of likely applicants, the report noted that the 
number of Corps-issued standard permits decreased 30% in the years 
following SWANCC and Rapanos.205 However, “information from the 
Corps indicates that the decline is mainly attributable to weakening 
economic conditions.”206 The two-page report offered little additional 
information and no concrete numbers on the probable economic impact 
that passage of the CWRA would have on the regulated community.207 
The CBO staff contact for impacts on the private sector confirmed this 
scarcity of data.208 
Since 1999, the CBO has prepared reports on at least eighteen other 
bills amending or otherwise relating to the CWA.209 Of those eighteen, 
                                                                                                                     
 203. CWRA CBO Cost Estimate, supra note 11, at 2. 
 204. Id. at 1–2. 
 205. Id. at 2. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 1–2. 
 208. Telephone Interview with Amy Petz, Analyst, Congressional Budget Office (Sept. 21, 
2009). 
 209. Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: S. 2080, Sewage Overflow Community 
Right-to-Know Act, at 1 (2008); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 2452, A Bill 
to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Ensure That Sewage Treatment Plants 
Monitor for and Report Discharges of Sewage, and for Other Purposes, at 1 (2008); 
Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: S. 3630, A Bill to Amend the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act to Reauthorize a Program Relating to the Lake Pontchartrain Basin, and 
for Other Purposes, at 1 (2006); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 3963, A Bill 
to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Extend the Authorization of 
Appropriations for Long Island Sound, at 1 (2005); Congressional Budget Office, Cost 
Estimate: H.R. 1721, A Bill to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Reauthorize 
Programs to Improve the Quality of Coastal Recreation Waters, and for Other Purposes, at 1 
(2005); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: S. 158, Long Island Sound Stewardship 
Act of 2005, at 1 (2005); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 1359, A Bill to 
Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Extend the Pilot Program for Alternative 
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none is as ambiguous about costs as the CWRA Cost Estimate.210 
Addressing the CWRA, the CBO noted that there is “no basis for 
estimating whether the cost [of passage of the CWRA] would exceed 
the annual thresholds established in [the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act] for intergovernmental or private-sector mandates.”211 Of the other 
eighteen cost estimates, all eighteen had estimates for the economic 
impacts on the federal government and the private sector.212 Only two 
of the eighteen did not have estimates for the costs to be imposed on 
intergovernmental agencies.213 However, both of these did have an 
estimate of the number of intergovernmental entities to be impacted,214 
information missing from the CBO Cost Estimate for the CWRA.215 
This evidences that proposing an amendment to the CWA with such 
scant information on costs is an aberration from congressional norms on 
modern CWA amendments.216 
                                                                                                                     
Water Source Projects, at 1 (2005); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 624, A 
Bill to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Authorize Appropriations for Sewer 
Overflow Control Grants, at 1 (2005); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 4731, 
A Bill to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Reauthorize the National Estuary 
Program, at 1 (2004); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 4688, A Bill to Amend 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Reauthorize the Chesapeake Bay Program, at 1 
(2004); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 4470, A Bill to Amend the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act to Extend the Authorization of Appropriations for the Lake 
Pontchartrain Basin Restoration Program from Fiscal Year 2005 to 2010, at 1 (2004); 
Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 784, A Bill to Amend the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act to Authorize Appropriations for Sewer Overflow Control Grants, at 1 
(2004); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: S. 1961, Water Investment Act of 2002, at 
1 (2002); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: S. 522, Beaches Environmental 
Assessment and Coastal Health Act of 2000, at 1 (2000); Congressional Budget Office, Cost 
Estimate: H.R. 1237, A Bill to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Permit Grants 
for the National Estuary Program to be Used for the Development and Implementation of a 
Comprehensive Conservation and Management Plan, to Reauthorize Appropriations to Carry 
out the Program, and for Other Purposes, at 1 (2000); Congressional Budget Office, Cost 
Estimate: H.R. 2328, A Bill to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Reauthorize 
the Clean Lakes Program, at 1 (2000); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: A Bill to 
Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Provide that Certain Environmental Reports 
Shall Continue to be Required to be Submitted, at 1 (1999) (no Senate number provided); 
Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 999, Beaches Environmental Assessment, 
Cleanup, and Health Act of 1999, at 1 (1999). 
 210. Compare sources cited supra note 209, with CWRA CBO Cost Estimate, supra note 
11. 
 211. CWRA CBO Cost Estimate, supra note 11, at 2. For 2009, these thresholds are $69 
million and $139 million, respectively. Id.  
 212. See supra note 209. 
 213. Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: S. 2080, Sewage Overflow Community 
Right-to-Know Act, at 2 (2008); Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 2452, A Bill 
to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to Ensure That Sewage Treatment Plants 
Monitor for and Report Discharges of Sewage, and for Other Purposes, at 2 (2008). 
 214. See sources cited supra note 213. 
 215. See CWRA CBO Cost Estimate, supra note 11. 
 216. See supra note 209. The eighteen CBO reports listed in footnote 209 were for far 
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Congressional passage of the CWRA without ascertaining a more 
exact cost estimate, or at least ome cost estimate, would be 
irresponsible. In his Rapanos dissent, Justice Stevens seemed 
untroubled by the plight of the regulated community.217 He commented 
that, “The fact that large investments are required to finance large 
developments merely means that those who are most adversely affected 
by the Corps’ permitting decisions are persons who have the ability to 
communicate effectively with their representatives.”218 Those 
individuals are communicating with their representatives, and the 
opinions thus far have been negative.219 However, it is difficult to say 
with certainty that the financiers of large developments are truly the 
people who would be most adversely affected. Home developers 
required to acquire § 404 permits are presumably passing costs on to 
consumers.220 In addition to the actual costs of permitting, developers 
incur various costs from delay.221 Developers waiting for permits must 
carry capital, which increases interest expenses for monies borrowed.222 
The developers must also bear labor expenses for additional time, 
further adding to total costs.223 Some of these costs are likely included 
in the costs finally paid by the consumers. Considering these factors, 
Justice Stevens’ opinion that those bearing the costs have adequate 
representation might not be entirely accurate.224 This, coupled with the 
uncertainty of what the overall costs would be, makes passage of the 
CWRA unwise. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
Should Congress enact the CWRA and remove the word “navigable” 
from the definition of waters reached by the CWA,225 it would be acting 
                                                                                                                     
simpler (and less ambitious) congressional proposals with more easily ascertainable cost 
estimates. The last CWA amendment to approach the scale of the CWRA was the Water Quality 
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). However, the CBO 
began producing cost estimates for impacts on the private sector only after passage of the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501–71 (2006). See Congressional 
Budget Office, CBO’s Role in the Budget Process, http://www.cbo.gov/aboutcbo/budgetprocess. 
shtml (last visited May 18, 2010). Consequently, there are no CBO cost estimates for major 
amendments to the CWA to compare with the CWRA Cost Estimate.  
 217. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 799 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 218. Id. 
 219. See sources cited supra notes 22 and 26–27. 
 220. See Sunding & Zilberman, supra note 6, at 81 (“A National Association of Home 
Builders survey reveals that all aspects of the Section 404 permitting process taken together add 
$400 to the price of an average new home. Viewed another way, the survey concludes that costs 
imposed by Section 404 requirements are 0.16 percent of total homebuilding costs and 0.4 
percent of total development costs.”). 
 221. Id. at 81–82. 
 222. Id. at 82. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 799 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 225. See CWRA, supra note 8, § 4(1). 
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within the commerce powers granted in Article I, § 8, of the 
Constitution.226 Many CWRA waters are “channels of interstate 
commerce” or “things in interstate commerce.”227 Other CWRA waters, 
in particular the “intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent 
streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet 
meadows, playa lakes, [] natural ponds[,] . . . [and] tributaries”228 not 
covered by the 1972 CWA, “substantially affect interstate 
commerce.”229 The CWRA exerts federal jurisdiction beyond waters 
with direct effects on commerce and includes even those waters where 
“activities affecting [the] waters[] are subject to the legislative power of 
Congress.”230 Though this admittedly “invokes the outer limits of 
Congress’ power,” it is within that limit, and the Act is a “clear 
indication that Congress intended that result.”231 
Despite the Act’s sound constitutional footing, however, Congress’ 
failure to discern the probable economic impacts suggests that more 
work should be done before enacting the CWRA or similar legislation. 
Further, it is uncertain where costs will rest, whether developers will 
absorb the costs or merely be a conduit to pass costs on to less well 
represented and less financially insulated citizens.232 To obtain the 92nd 
Congress’ goal to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,”233 some sort of legislative 
amendment to § 404 jurisdiction is likely appropriate. It would be 
irresponsible, however, for Congress to pass the Act in its present form. 
To expect citizens to support legislation with unknown repercussive 
costs is an unrealistic and imprudent endeavor. 
                                                                                                                     
 226. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
 227. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). 
 228. See CWRA, supra note 8, § 3(8)(C), (E). 
 229. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559; supra Part IV.A. 
 230. See CWRA, supra note 8, § 4(25). 
 231. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001). 
 232. See supra Part V. 
 233. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
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